![]() Contributed By
|
Recently, I responded to an electronic mail list inquiry about Clemenceau's biting comment on Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, "Even the good Lord contented Himself with only ten commandments, and we should not try to improve upon them." Georges Clemenceau was one of the most famous and biting wits of
his age. His observations, jokes, sallies, and jests impressed even the
most hardened generals and politicians. This ability to impress senior
leaders accounts for a great deal of his charisma. His impact on his peers
in the council chambers was so great that many of his aphorisms have
subsequently become embedded in the historical literature, yet have been
repeated over and over again without reference to their original context.
As a result, historians have often reduced Clemenceau to a few stock
phrases or jokes, and have lost sight of his complex character and
policies. The quotation in question is a typical case in point. It was
attributed to Clemenceau by many participants at the Paris Peace
Conference (Colonel House, etc...), and is generally interpreted as proof
that Clemenceau was a cynical old school diplomat who was opposed to
Wilsonianism. In fact, the phrase in question was first attributed to him
well before the Paris Peace Conference began. Set in fuller context, it
sheds light on his complex relationship with both the United States and
Woodrow Wilson. Inter-allied tensions did not begin in January 1919, as
many books assume, but rather had their roots in Clemenceau's personal
relationship with the United States, and in the diplomatic and strategic
quarrels of the First World War.
![]() Clemenceau Visiting Men of the US 2nd DivisionClemenceau's thinking about the United States and Wilson was partly revealed by a column he wrote after the American entry into the war in his newspaper, L'Homme Enchaine, which was reprinted in the New York Times on April 5, 1917. In this, Clemenceau wrote that the American intervention in European affairs was "one of the greatest revolutions in history," comparable in importance to the Russian Revolution in March. He presciently predicted that the American army would have a decisive impact on the war in spite of the u-boats. He made amends to his previous criticisms of Wilson by praising the latter's idealism, and expressed the hope that mankind would evolve peacefully toward a more "equitable organization of labor". However, he added two important caveats. First, he was not convinced that mankind was "heading straight toward the society of nations." Secondly, he reminded his audiences that great principles for which America and Wilson now stood had originated in Europe. [FN 1]. Clemenceau paid careful attention to the White House after taking power in France in November 1917. When the Fourteen Points were proclaimed in January 1918, he accorded them the highest importance. According to Bertrand Favreau, when Clemenceau's assistant Georges Mandel received news of the Fourteen Points at 3 am in the morning, he immediately rushed to wake the Tiger. During the twenty months that Clemenceau's government held power, this was apparently one of the three occasions on which Mandel deemed it necessary to wake Clemenceau in the middle of the night. [FN. 2] ![]() Walking the Battlefield with PoilusThe very soul of bureaucracy, Hankey's sense of humor was somewhat lacking - he either did not record Clemenceau's jokes, or when he did, he failed to capture the essence of their wit. It is a bit of a mystery what Clemenceau witticisms were, although according to Frances Stevenson, he objected vociferously to the presence of a junior American diplomat, Arthur Frazier, at the deliberations of the SWC, by furiously exclaiming: "Taking notes for President Wilson! No doubt the Kaiser would also like to send a shorthand writer to these meetings!" [FN. 6] As far my researches indicate, the first report on Clemenceau's joke about Wilson having four points more than God surfaced in October 1918. After six terrible months of fighting in 1918, Britain and France were counting on the AEF to relieve much of the burden they were carrying. Their expectations were too high, and they were consequently bitterly disappointed by General Pershing's failure to achieve a dramatic success in the Argonne offensive in September-October 1918. Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau were bitterly critical of Pershing at this point. Their pique at the USA was worsened by Wilson's attempts to mediate an armistice between the Allies and Bulgaria. In Clemenceau's view, Wilson had no right to intervene in this affair because he had not declared war on Bulgaria. Furthermore, it was his position that armistices should only be negotiated by the local military commander-in-chief, who in this case, was the French general, Franchet D'Esperey. Clemenceau won this argument against Wilson, thus setting an important precedent in inter-allied circles for Marshal Foch's armistice negotiations with the Germans. Reports of the Tiger's complaints about Wilson soon crossed the channel. The British political insider Lord Esher thus recorded in his diary on October 14, 1918 that: "Clemenceau said: 'God was satisfied with Ten Commandments. Wilson gives us fourteen.' " [FN. 7] A slightly different version of this story made the rounds of London's clubland a fortnight later. On November 1, 1918, the _Manchester Guardian_ reported that when a draft of Wilson's 14 points was presented to Clemenceau, he was reputed to have said: "Quatorze points, mais cela est un peu fort. Le bon Dieu n'en avait que dix." (trans: "Fourteen points: that's a bit much. The good lord had only ten.") [FN. 8]. ![]() The Big Four at the Paris Peace ConferenceSources and Thanks: The photos here contributed by Tony Langley. This piece is based on my dissertation:
|
To find other features on France at War visit our |
Membership Information ![]() Click on Icon |
For further information on the events of 1914-1918
visit the homepage of |