Contributed by Col. Robert A. Doughty
Professor of History
U.S. Military Academy
West Point
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The famous "miracle of the Marne" came as much from French
successes as from German failures. Especially since the fall of
France in 1940, historians have sometimes viewed the French as
the beneficiaries of German errors and have given the French
little credit for their victory. The time has come to take
another look at the reasons for the French success.
To begin, France's grand strategy provided the foundation
for the "miracle of the Marne." Historians often overlook the
fact that French strategy was an alliance strategy and that
Russia, not Great Britain, was France's most important ally.
From the time of the first agreement in 1891 with Russia, France
sought to force Germany to "fight at the same time in the east
and the west." At the staff talks held between 1900 and 1913,
France and Russia confirmed Germany's defeat as the "first and
principal objective" of the two allies and the defeat of
Germany's allies as subordinate objectives. While the British
added additional troops in the West and reduced Germany's
numerical advantage, the French did not expect much from them and
were not certain they would arrive in time to participate in the
campaign. Having the Russians as allies, however, forced the
Germans to spread their resources across two widely separated
fronts. Though the initial battles on the Western and Eastern
Front did not yield the results the French optimistically
expected, the Germans did shift two corps to the Eastern Front on
August 25 and thereby weakened the "hammer" in their drive into
France. Given the slimness of the Marne victory, those two corps
could have made the difference between victory and defeat on the
Western Front.
Action at the Marne
More so than its grand strategy, France's campaign strategy
suffered from several serious flaws. While historians have often
compared Plan XVII to the Schlieffen Plan, French strategy in
August 1914 was not Plan XVII, which was a concentration plan.
In fact, French strategy was Joffre's own, and he intended to
comply with the agreement hammered out in numerous staff talks
with the Russians and launch an offensive. Reluctant to reveal
his intentions to political leaders and convinced the Germans
would drive through Belgium, Joffre kept his intentions about
advancing into Belgium private and did not reveal his strategy
until August 8, when he issued General Instructions No. 1.
Aiming to destroy the enemy's forces, not occupy or regain
territory, Joffre wanted to jab with his right and attempt a
knockout blow with his left. On his right he launched a raid
into Alsace on August 7 and a supporting attack by First and
Second armies into Lorraine on August 14 (the day the Russians
began their offensive); on his left he ordered Third and Fourth
armies into Belgium toward Arlon and Neufchâteau on August 21.
While the raid into Alsace and the offensive on the right
attempted to fix the German left and draw enemy forces to the
south, the main attack on the left aimed to strike the less
dense, more vulnerable German center in eastern Belgium and
unhinge the powerful enemy force driving through central Belgium.
Despite great hopes for success, the supporting attack into
Alsace-Lorraine and the main attack into eastern Belgium
encountered strong resistance and were thrown back by the
Germans. Joffre had grossly misjudged the size of the enemy
forces in eastern Belgium, and the spirited, gallant charges by
his soldiers collapsed in the face of withering machine gun and
artillery fire. His strategy thus was disastrous and provided no
advantage to the French.
As France had prepared to fight within Joffre's strategy,
however, it had organized and equipped its forces for the offense
and emphasized maneuver more so than firepower. The result was
not only the infamous offensive a outrance but also light, mobile
tactical units with minimal logistical and artillery support.
French corps, for example, had only 75-mm cannon and expected to
use artillery only to support an attack, not to fire days of
preparation prior to one. Designed to charge into Belgium, the
lean corps could maneuver easily or be moved rapidly over long
distances. Beginning on the morning of August 24, Joffre started
shifting forces from his right to his left. The first unit
alerted for movement to the left was VII Corps which had
performed poorly in the first attack into Alsace, but which was
now moved from Joffre's far right to his far left. Had French
units been trained and organized to fight defensively, rather
than offensively, or had they been provided much more robust
logistical and artillery support, they may not have been as
mobile or as responsive when Joffre cobbled together his surge to
the west.
Action at the Marne
To move units from Joffre's fain right to his far left,
transportation specialists relied on the national network of
railways. That system was built in the mid-l800s and initially
resembled spokes on a wheel radiating from the hub, Paris. Later
in the nineteenth century the French improved their railways by
connecting these spokes at various locations, thus enabling
trains to run from eastern France to northern France without
passing directly through Paris. Also important was Joffre's
understanding of the French railway system and its effect on
strategic mobility. The foundation of that understanding was
established in September-October 1909 when he became Director of
Rear Services for the French army. After joining the Superior
Council of War in February 1910, he conducted a very thorough
assessment of France's requirements for artillery and, as part of
that assessment, took a careful look at the strategic and
operational movement of large units. He also directed two
"maneuvers," one in February 1911 and the other in June, in which
French forces were moved by railway from one extreme wing to
another. As he states in his memoirs, these exercises contained
the essential elements of the "maneuver of the Marne." Prewar
experiences thus enabled Joffre to think through and accomplish
the shifting of forces from his far right to his far left in
August and September 1914.
Another contributing factor to the French victory pertains
to communications. The German First Army, for example, relied
almost exclusively on wireless transmission but had only two
transmitting stations, one of which was connected directly with
Moltke's headquarters and the other indirectly through Second
Army. Since Moltke's headquarters had only one receiver, it
often took several hours for a message to arrive. Furthermore,
inclement weather interrupted communications, as did jamming from
the Eiffel Tower. Having to encode or decode messages added to
the time required to send or receive a message. According to
First Army's chief of staff, important messages required as much
as twenty-four hours for delivery. The distance between
Moltke's headquarters and those of his subordinates compounded
German difficulties. Since Moltke had to command forces in East
Prussia as well as in Belgium and France, he initially located
his headquarters in Koblenz but moved it on August 30 to a girls'
school in Luxembourg. When written orders were sent from Koblenz
or Luxembourg to First or Second Army headquarters, they often
arrived, as the First Army Commander explained, "after the most
important events had already begun."
In contrast to these difficulties, Joffre remained in close
contact with his subordinates. An advantage for the French came
from their falling back on their lines of communications and
their relying on the telephone. While Moltke issued no orders
from September 5 to 9 and received no reports from his First and
Second Army commanders from September 7 to 9, Joffre maintained
contact with his army commanders via telephone (even though he
preferred written messages). The French also gained very
valuable information from intercepted wireless transmissions.
For example, on August 30 and 31, the British pulled back from
the fighting line and left a huge hole between Sixth and Fifth
armies. The French hoped the Germans would not find the gap, but
an intercepted German radio transmission warned them that an
enemy corps was poised to cross the Oise River near Bailly and
march east. Only the early warning from the radio intercept, as
well as some extraordinary luck, enabled Fifth Army to escape its
perilous situation.
Action at the Marne
The frequent meetings Joffre had with his subordinate
commanders and Sir John French provided the French another
advantage. These meetings enabled him to take careful measure of
his subordinates, provide them key instructions, and ensure they
followed his directions. More than anything else, these meetings
enabled the French and British to pull back successfully and
operate in a coordinated, effective fashion. The meeting on
August 26 between Joffre, Sir John, and General Charles Lanrezac,
for example, provided Joffre important insights into what was
happening on his left. The meeting occurred while British II
Corps was heavily engaged at Le Cateau and revealed bad feelings
between Lanrezac and Sir John. The British commander insisted
Fifth Army had not kept him informed about its withdrawals and
had left the British isolated. While the meeting provided Joffre
an opportunity to explain his new campaign strategy with Sir
John, it also provided him the first hint of Sir John's intention
to pull out of the battle. In another meeting on August 30 with
the British commander, Joffre tried to convince the British
marshal to return his troops to the battle line between the Fifth
and Sixth armies and provide Sixth Army time to assemble
completely. After Sir John adamantly refused to do anything for
forty-eight hours, Joffre left the British headquarters extremely
discouraged, convinced he could not launch a counterattack near
Amiens around the German right wing and certain he would have to
change his strategy. When he returned to his headquarters, he
ordered Fifth Army to break contact and withdraw, and he focused
his efforts on halting the enemy along a new line running between
Compiègne, Soissons, and Reims, thirty to forty kilometers to the
rear of the Amiens-Reims line. The meeting had discouraged him
but it had provided him the information he needed to respond to
the new situation.
Another key meeting occurred on September 5 when Joffre met
with Sir John French and urged him to participate in the
counteroffensive the following day. In an emotional presentation
the French general-in-chief explained his strategy, provided a
description of the coming battle, and emphasized that he was
committing all his soldiers into the battle in order to achieve
victory. British forces, Joffre insisted, would play a crucial
role in the campaign, but if they chose not to participate, their
absence would be "severely judged by history." Banging his fist
on the table, Joffre concluded, "The honor of England is at
stake, Marshal." Sir John's faced turned red, and after a short
silence, he tried to say something in French but then told one of
the officers near him, "Damn it, I can't explain. Tell him that
all that men can do our fellows will do." Without such meetings,
Joffre could not have coordinated the complex withdrawal of the
Allies and remained in close touch with what was happening. To
underline their importance, think for a moment about what may
have happened had Joffre been as distant or detached as Moltke.
Beyond a doubt, the withdrawal would not have been well
coordinated. More importantly, had Sir John French had almost no
contact with him (as did Kluck and von Bülow with Moltkè), there
is little doubt he and his troops would have withdrawn past Paris
and never re-entered the battle.
Action at the Marne
Telephonic communications affected other important aspects
of the campaign. For example, Gallieni called Joffre on the
evening of the 4th and demanded the counteroffensive occur on the
6th, not on the 7th. Basically, Gallieni argued that Maunoury's
Sixth Army would move into position--as directed by Joffre--on
the evening of the 4th and probably would make contact with the
enemy on the afternoon of the 5th and alert them to the threat
against their flank. Recognizing the validity of Gallieni's
concerns, Joffre changed the date of attack to the morning of
September 6. At 2200 hours on September 4, Joffre's staff
published the order providing the details for the attack on the
Germans' extreme right on the 6th. And the final important
change had occurred because of a telephone call from Gallieni.
Personal contact between Joffre and his subordinate
commanders also enabled him to intercede when they began to
falter. On August 30, he visited Third Army's headquarters and
found its commander, General Ruffey, "very nervous" and "bitter"
about the performance of his subordinates. The meeting occurred
after liaison officers had warned Joffre of problems in Third
Army. Judging it "imprudent" to leave Rut fey in command, Joffre
relieved him. Four days later he relieved General Lanrezac,
commander of Fifth Army. The relief of Lanrezac was "intensely
painful" to Joffre who had known him for years and had great
esteem for his intellectual gifts, but he had lost confidence in
the Fifth Army commander and had tired of Lanrezac's challenging
his orders. Just prior to meeting Lanrezac and relieving him,
Joffre had met with General Franchet d'Espèrey and asked him if
he were capable of commanding an army. The general had responded simply, "As well as anyone else." Needless to say, Franchet d'Espèrey turned out to be one of France's finest commanders.
A More Animated Joffre Than Usually Depicted
Beyond a doubt most of credit for what came to be known as
the "miracle of the Marne" belongs to Joffre. After the collapse
of his attempted maneuver around the German flank at Amiens, he
kept his forces under control and did not panic when the Germans
moved around the flank and into the rear of Fifth Army. As
French and British forces withdrew, he remained in constant
contact with them and prepared a counteroffensive. Though he did
not foresee the subsequent course of events and did not attempt
to trap the Germans, he recognized the opportunity to strike the
enemy forces in their flank when Kluck's First Army turned to the
east of Paris. In reality, this opportunity resembled what he
had tried to do with Sixth Army on the Amiens-Reims line.
Additionally, as Sixth, British, and Fifth armies attacked the
Germans' right flank, Joffre displayed strong judgment and a
remarkable degree of composure in his calm response to near
disasters on both flanks of Fourth army, the right of Ninth Army,
the left of Third Army, and the front of Second Army. Perhaps
his greatest achievement was that he did not permit these near
disasters to divert resources from the crucial actions on his
left. Though he initially sought an envelopment with Sixth
Army's attack from Paris against the enemy flank, he reacted
capably and appropriately when a gap opened between the German
First and Second armies and provided him the opportunity to send
forces deep into the enemy's position. Gallieni's role was
important, but the key concepts and decisions belonged to Joffre.
In comparison to Sir John French, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich,
Helmuth von Moltke, and Baron Conrad von Hôtzendorff, Joffre
clearly was the best of the major commanders in this phase of the
war, and he amply deserved the outpouring of praise he received
after the victory of the Marne.
The Marne and Marshal Joffre Commemorated in a Childrens Book
Joffre, however, does not deserve all the credit. Without
the valiant effort that came from the French soldiers, no
Miracle of the Marne" would have been possible. For the
soldiers who did the marching and fighting, the cost of the
victory was not small, for some 329,000 of them were killed or
missing in August and September 1914, the largest loss during any
comparable period in the war. According to General Lanrezac, his
soldiers in Fifth Army withdrew 140 kilometers from August 30 to
September 5. As they withdrew, discipline began to break down,
and some soldiers deserted their units. A few began pillaging
and terrifying civilians. The great majority of the French
soldiers however maintained their discipline and their unit
cohesion. Rumors of German atrocities--including shooting
defenseless civilians, burning villages, and widespread raping
and pillaging--strengthened the soldiers resolve to continue
marching until the time was right for them to turn on the enemy.
In the final analysis, their ability and willingness to stop
withdrawing on September 5 or 6, do an about-face against enemy
pressure, and resume the offensive was truly remarkable. Their
grim determination to drive the German invaders from their
nations s soil ultimately made the difference in the outcome of
the "miracle of the Marne."
Sources and Thanks: Col. Doughty originally presented this paper at the 2003 Seminar of the Great War Society. Photos from regular contributor Tony Langley's fabulous magazine collection.
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