Contributed by Col. Robert A. Doughty
Professor of History U.S. Military Academy West Point




French Mobilization, 1914


Since 1918 historians have considered Plan XVII the embodiment of French strategy in 1914 and have seen French thinkers such as Ardant du Picq and Ferdinand Foch as providing the primary intellectual force behind the offensive a outrance. A more careful examination of French documents and experience, however, leads one to a different view of French strategy and the sources of their strategic thinking and doctrine. In reality Plan XVII was nothing more than a concentration plan and an expression of alternatives, and French strategy in 1914 was devised and controlled personally by General Joseph Joffre. Just as Joffre dominated the formulations of strategy, he also dominated the development of French doctrine and more so than any other person was the "father" of offensive a outrance.


Joffre
To understand Joffre's influence over French strategy and doctrine, it is necessary to recall the political and strategic environment in July 1911 when he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Beyond the second Moroccan crisis and the arrival of the German gunboat Panther off Agadir, the French High Command experienced considerable turmoil in 1910-1911 with General Victor Michel becoming the Vice President of the Superior Council of War in 1910 and Andre Messimy becoming Minister of War on June 30, 1911. Adding to the tension, Lieutenant Colonel Louis Loyzeaux de Grandmaison, the head of the Third Bureau of the General Staff, gave his famous lectures on tactics in February 1911 criticizing the "nearly complete atrophy" of the offensive spirit in the French army and calling for a renewal of that spirit. When Messimy forced Michel's resignation in July 1911, he did so because of his complete lack of confidence in Michel as a leader and as a strategic and doctrinal thinker. Ironically, Michel had called not only for the integration of active and reserve forces but also for a new strategy permitting a "vigorous" offensive into Belgium, but he nonetheless had rejected the suggestions of Grandmaison and sought a more balanced doctrine.

When Joffre assumed his new position in 1911, he proved to be a strong believer in the offensive, for he energetically supported Grandmaison's ideas and worked to revise French doctrine and make it more "modern." He also initiated a program of maneuvers and map exercises to develop the tactical and strategic skills of the French army. In addition to increasing emphasis on the offensive, these maneuvers and map exercises contributed to his broad goal of revising French doctrine. After months of hard work, the French codified their new doctrine in October 1913 in a new regulation on the operations of large units (corps, army, and army group) and in December 1913 in one on slightly smaller units (regiment, brigade, and division) The 1913 regulations on the operations of large units fastened the offensive a outrance onto the French army, and the commission that wrote those regulations asserted, "The French army, returning to its traditions, accepts no law in the conduct of operations other than the offensive."


German Troops Mobilizing

Among the important changes signaled in these new regulations was the doctrinal relationship between artillery and infantry. New infantry and artillery regulations also appeared about the same time as the two regulations on the maneuver of large units. Whereas previous regulations had envisaged the artillery firing numerous rounds and blasting enemy positions for long periods prior to an assault, the new regulations on artillery published on the eve of the Great War warned against the massive use of artillery and called for support only during the infantry's advance. For Joffre, as well as the other proponents of the new doctrine, the "supreme weapon" of the infantry was the bayonet and the mission of the infantry was "glorious above all." France's confidence in the bayonet even extended to the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre adopting a bayonet for the cavalry in February 1912.

Joffre's faith in the offensive is evident not only in the numerous attacks he launched from 1914 to 1916 but also in his halfhearted support for the development of heavy artillery before the war. Ironically, the day Michel presented his plan to the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre in 1911 for reorganizing the French army and pursuing a new strategy, Joffre led the discussion and supported the development of a "light howitzer." Michel -- who was outvoted on every key issue that day -- opposed the development of a light howitzer because it would multiply the number of calibers in France's artillery, while Joffre ostensibly supported its development because of its greater range and its ability to fire rounds into defilade positions on the reverse slopes. In subsequent months, the artillery's technical service used clever bureaucratic maneuvers to block the development of heavier artillery, including the adoption of a hybrid model which could be switched from 75 mm to 120 mm by changing barrels and the development of fins for 75 mm rounds so plunging fire was possible. Despite the evident intransigence of the technical services, Joffre did little to overcome their resistance and in a meeting of the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre in October 1913 even argued strongly against giving heavy artillery to corps. He could foresee circumstances in which heavy artillery could be useful, but he did not desire to burden corps and divisions with relatively immobile heavy artillery and preferred keeping heavy artillery at higher echelons so it could be concentrated where needed. Though Joffre had supported in the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre the development of heavier artillery, he believed by January 1914 that French artillery compared favorably to German and could negate the adversary's range advantage by skillful use of its mobility. As Andre Messimy later suggested, Joffre did little to overcome the inertia of the technical services and remained content with France's famous 75-mm cannon.


Early French Trench

Joffre's contribution to offense a outrance thus went beyond the realm of emotion and morale and entered the domain of organizations, equipment, and methods. His revision of French regulations, his orchestration of numerous maneuvers and map exercises, and his reluctance to develop heavy artillery firmly fixed the new doctrine onto the army. Though, as in any army, adoption of new doctrine proceeded at different paces in various parts of the army, Joffre's presence ensured emphasis on the offensive would prevail. Beyond a doubt, had Michel remained Chief of the General Staff, France's subsequent experience and its infatuation with the cult of the offensive would have been dramatically different.

Joffre also played an extremely important role in developing and executing French strategy. Contrary to common perception, he and other commanders remained keenly concerned about Belgium as they reconsidered French strategy and war plans after 1911. This concern had long percolated through the High Command; one of Michel's main concerns, for example, was his belief that the Germans would concentrate their forces in the north rather than the east and would seek a "definitive solution in the very heart of Belgium." After carefully considering French and German alternatives, Joffre sought permission at a meeting of the Superior Council of National Defense on January 12,1912, to advance into Belgium at the first news of a German attack. Composed of the President of the Republic, Premier, Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Chief of the General Staff, the Superior Council was not a decision-making body, but the Premier, Joseph Caillaux, made it clear that French forces could not enter Belgium until after the Germans had violated its neutrality. Caillaux emphasized, "Not one French soldier will put a foot on the soil of Belgium if the Germans respect the treaties [of neutrality] ." After Raymond Poincare became Premier, Joffre again sought permission to enter Belgium. He argued that favorable terrain for an advance into Alsace and Lorraine did not exist and that an "infinitely more advantageous" opportunity for offensive action existed in Belgium. Poincare, however, refused to permit French forces to enter Belgium prior to Germany's violating its neutrality. After two premiers adamantly opposed violating Belgium's neutrality, Joffre had no choice but to accept their decision.


Fr. Infantryman, 1914
Despite these restrictions, Joffre remained convinced of the advantages of an offensive strategy. His faith in the offensive stemmed not only from his confidence in such operations but also from his confidence in the value of a two-front war against Germany. Talks with the Russians occurred each fall while Joffre was Chief of the General Staff, and in August 1913 he traveled to Russia in order to participate in the staff talks and convince his hosts to began an offensive on the fourteenth day after mobilization. When Joffre participated in the staff talks in 1912 and 1913, he insisted on simultaneous attacks on the two sides of Germany and assured the Russian representatives that France would abide by the articles of Franco-Russian military convention which required France to launch a vigorous offensive against Germany with more than a million soldiers. Confident of the advantages of a two-front war against Germany, Joffre considered Russia more important than Britain in his strategy and plans. While testifying before a parliamentary commission in July 1919, Joffre stated, "Personally, I was convinced that they [the British] would come, but in the end there was no commitment on their part. There were only studies on the means of embarkation and debarkation and places reserved for their troops."

Joffre's strategic and operational concepts thus looked beyond the simple effect of France's acting against Germany and were inextricably linked to a simultaneous offensive by Russia. The location of Joffre's attack, however, remained uncertain; he could attack into Alsace-Lorraine or Belgium, or both. As he considered his alternatives, he refused to reveal his thinking to his subordinates or to his political masters. As political, diplomatic, and military factors changed in the opening days of a war, substantial alterations to plans completed in peacetime would have to be made. Even more important, political authorities could "meddle" -- Joffre's words -- in military affairs if they knew a plan of operations had been completed in peacetime. Joffre's reluctance to share his concept of operations with not only his political superiors but also his subordinates or to commit himself to a course of action prior to the war became apparent in a meeting with his army commanders in early August 1914. When General Yvon Dubail, commander of First Army and a participant in the staff talks with Russia, asked for additional troops for his attack into Alsace, Joffre coyly responded, "That's your plan, not mine." After the war, General de Castelnau explained to a parliamentary commission the difference between a concentration plan and an operational plan and emphasized that Joffre's options were closely held by him and never discussed with any of the military councils. Several months later Joffre appeared before the same parliamentary commission and also explained the difference between a concentration plan and an operational plan. While a concentration plan, Joffre said, would result in troops assembling on the frontier ready for combat, a commander could decide on an operational plan only after he received intelligence about what the enemy was doing.

In short, France's strategy in August 1914 was Joffre's strategy, and he avoided revealing his intentions to anyone. While Plan XVII provided for the mobilization and concentration of the French army in the northeast and included alternatives for possible maneuver, it was not a blueprint for strategy and operations in August 1914. In his memoirs Joffre explained that even though Plan XVII established the broad outlines of possible maneuvers, it was "impossible to fix a definitive maneuver for execution a long time in advance."


Dead of Both Armies in the Champagne

With the broad outlines of French strategy influenced by Joffre's own preference for the offensive and shaped by the requirement to launch a massive offensive simultaneously with Russia, Joffre carefully considered the Germans' capability to advance through Belgium. The question was not whether the Germans would advance through Belgium, but rather how deep their advance would be. No one, including Joffre, expected the Germans to make their main attack on the left bank of the Meuse from Liege to Namur through what later became known as the Gembloux Gap.

French strategy and doctrine in 1914 were thus shaped by the senior officer in the army, Joffre. Buoyed by his confidence in the value of the offensive, the vulnerability of the Germans to a two-front war, and the likelihood of the Germans making their main attack through Belgium, he awaited the right moment to unleash his decisive attack. Unfortunately for France, however, the Germans proved more resourceful, resilient, numerous, and unpredictable than what he expected. Despite the failure of his strategy, he did not lose his faith in the offensive, and until the collapse of the Champagne operation in October 1915, he unleashed attack after attack against the solidly entrenched enemy. By the end of the Champagne offensive, France had suffered more than 50% of the losses it would incur during the war and was vulnerable to Falkenhayn's 1916 attempt to bleed it white at Verdun. Joffre's strategy and his faith in the offensive thus brought the French to the brink of disaster, and only a fundamental change in strategy enabled them to continue in the war.

Sources and Thanks: Col. Doughty originally presented this paper at the 1998 Seminar of the Great War Society and it was subsequently published as an article in Relevance: The Quarterly Journal of the Great War Society, Winter 1999, Vol. Eight, No. Two. Photos from regular contributors Tony Langley and Ray Menzer.



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