Contributed by Pierre Miquel
Professor of History: The Sorbonne Paris, France




The French and British Commanders at the Start of War
Marshal Joffre and Sir John French


At the outset of the Great War , the leadership of the French Army was in the hands of General Joffre, a career officer and engineer with a solid experience in organization acquired in the French Colonies. He had been appointed in 1911 at a time of internal political turmoil and lowered morale in the officer corps, which followed the Dreyfus Case. Joffre had also been selected for his strong attachment to the values of the Third Republic.

When he took office, he found a situation that had major gaps, in terms of manpower and armament, and advised the French Government that the country was not ready at that time to sustain a war with Germany. Joffre first addressed the manpower deficiency issue by pressing the French Parliament to pass, in August 1913, the" Loi de Trois Ans" which extended compulsory military service to a period of three years.

Joffre also found the French Army to be virtually devoid of modem heavy field artillery. The French Model 1897 field gun, the famous French 75, did exist in adequate numbers ( over 4000). However, while being accurate, fast firing and deadly against infantry in the open, the French 75 had a range not exceeding 7 kms. Conversely, German heavy field artillery ( e.g.. the 1 (~nm, 150mm and 210mm howitzers) outranged the French 75 by at least 3 kms , while their heavier shells inflicted more damage . This deficiency in French heavy field artillery proved to be nearly fatal in the early months of the war.


Notable French Leaders Earlier in the War
Gallieni, Esperey, Nivelle

This deficiency was vexing given the fact that private French armament firms (Schneider and Saint Chamond) had been supplying Russia and Balkan countries with modem heavy artillery, beginning in 1905. Yet Joffre had only approved in 1913 the limited adoption of the 105mm Schneider, a modem howitzer with a range in excess of 10 kms. The jealous monopoly of government arsenals (they alone manufactured the French 75 ) may have had something to do with this deliberate neglect. Nevertheless, the choice of by-passing heavy field artillery did follow the French tactical doctrines prevailing at that time . Those were inspired by the offensive spirit, relying on the "elan" of French infantry. Therefore they did require lightness and mobility on the part of field artillery. Because of this tactical vision, the use of machine guns did not receive the attention it deserved either. The government arsenal model adopted in 1907, the St Etienne, did not measure up to the privately manufactured Hotchkiss used in the French colonies, nor to the German Maxims.

As far as strategy is concerned, Joffre's realism inspired him to limit the French strategic objectives to carrying out "Plan XVII". The latter aimed at the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine together with a pursuit into the Sarre region. This strategy was in contrast to the German" Schlieffen Plan" which aimed at the wholesale destruction of the French Army in a few weeks.

Victory on the Marne, in September 1914, following devastating French infantry losses in August near the German borders , saved not only France herself, but also general Joffre's reputation. To his credit , he displayed a mastery of logistics and troop movements that made the Marne turnaround possible. His coolness under pressure and his ruthless demotion of incompetent generals during the battle also played a significant role.

Following the Battle of the Marne, one observes the beginning of a tightening of the political power structures over those of Joffre and the General Staff. The management of armament procurement passed under the civilian jurisdiction of a socialist M.P. named Albert Thomas who reported directly to the Prime Minister. The change began by the placement of massive orders for modern heavy artillery from both Schneider and Saint Chamond . Furthermore, fortress artillery of an older model (De Bange) , being already present in large numbers, was hastily transformed for field use. Lastly, Parliamentary Commissions of Enquiry were formed and made it their business to ask questions everywhere, including in the front lines. By the end of 1915 the French Nation had already 600,000 men dead and missing, mostly in July and August of 1914 and also during the two fruitless Joffre offensives in 1915 (Artois and Champagne).

Verdun and the Somme, in 1916 , added a further 350,000 Frenchmen dead and missing. The successful defense at Verdun was to permit the success of a major Franco-British offensive that would follow on the Somme , but that hope failed to materialize. From that point on , the fate of general Joffre was politically sealed.


French Leadership at the End
Petain, Clemenceau and Foch

Prime Minister Briand elevated Joffre to the rank of Marshall of France and had him replaced by general Nivelle who had successfully recaptured much of the lost ground at Verdun, during the fall of 1916. General Nivelle proceeded to prepare a spring offensive in order to recapture the German positions on the Chemin des Dames, to the north of Paris. His efforts at convincing the French and British political leaderships overcame their skepticism. However the French Minister for War, General Liautey, resigned in order not to have his name attached to what he predicted would be a failure. A negative result was also predicted by Petain. Prime Minister Briand also resigned at the same time. After much internal debate, however, the ill-fated Chemin des Dames offensive went ahead on April 16 and quickly ground to a halt. The dead and missing between the period April to June 1916 in that sector alone mounted to well over 100,000 men.

It took this failure and mutinies affecting half the French Army, to bring George Clemenceau into the post of Prime Minister in November 1917. In contrast with the timidity of his predecessors, Clemenceau boldly increased civilian control over the military leadership which now was in the hands of Petain and Foch. Furthermore he involved himself personally with the Allies to coordinate the applications of basic military strategies. Thus he found no major difficulties in convincing Lloyd George and President Wilson, to accept Foch as overall military leader of the Alliance, in the Spring of 1918. At the French military operational level, for instance, he pressed Petain to move up French divisions to help Haig take the brunt of the Ludendorff Spring Offensive in April 1918. At a later date he also pressed Foch to request British divisional support in Champagne, after Ludendorff had shifted his assaults onto the French sector.

During the weeks preceding the November 11 Armistice, another political debate involving the generals took place. Petain agreed with the American position ,expressed by Pershing ,which advocated not to sign an armistice before Allied troops had penetrated into the Rhineland . As to Foch, he approved the British strategic goals which had set as a priority the military liberation of Flanders and Belgium. Clemenceau, after convincing Lloyd George, ignored their advices and imposed the signature of an armistice immediately. By that date the French nation had lost nearly 1.4 million military personnel, dead or missing in action.

Since Foch had been placed in charge of the execution of the terms of the Armistice, he overstepped his mission in 1919 by advocating a permanent French presence in the Rhineland. This brought him political disgrace.

So in France, contrary to the evolution which took place in Germany, the exercise of war powers steadily shifted from the hands of the military leadership into the hands of a steadily more assertive political coalition of the center left. Unfortunately, France experienced no less than seven governmental coalitions during the Great War and the military leadership exploited these political fragmentations to its own advantage. However the elimination of Joffre and Nivelle, the resignation of Liautey, all were landmarks in the positive evolution of civilian control over the military.. While Clemenceau had been accused of acting as a dictator by his political opponents, he had nevertheless succeeded in controlling the military to the end , notably by taking advantage of the rivalry existing between Foch and Petain. Under this point of view, his political mastery helped make the final victory and the Armistice of November 11 possible.


Victory Commemorated on a French Magazine Cover

Sources and Thanks: Professor Miquel originally presented this paper at the 2003 Seminar of the Great War Society. Photos from regular contributors Tony Langley and Ray Menzer.



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