Contributed by Hugo Rodrigues
Sintra, Portugal

BACKGROUND

The alleged reason for Portugal's entry in the Great War was its historical alliance with England and later Great Britain, which dates back to 1386. This alliance (the Treaty of Windsor) was the cornerstone of Portuguese foreign policy until Portugal's admission into NATO after World War II, but, as is perhaps to be expected, always meant much more for Portugal than for Britain. But other causes contributed to it as well.


National War Memorial, Lisbon

The Partido Republicano Português (Portuguese Republican Party) in power in 1914 owed much of its steady growth in popularity and ultimate success in overthrowing the Monarchy (which fell, being replaced by a Republic, on 5 October 1910) to the popular uproar caused by the King and Cabinet giving in to the infamous British "Ultimatum" of January 1890, which threatened Portugal with war if Portuguese colonial expeditions didn't immediately evacuate parts of what would later become Rhodesia which they had occupied. Both the Portuguese public opinion and the Republican leaders were thus still very reluctant to acknowledge as an ally a country which had inflicted upon the Portuguese Nation as a whole what was regarded as one of the greatest humiliations of its history.

But the same Republican politicians also realistically understood that Portugal's entry in the war was probably the only way to save its African colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Two secret treaties between Great Britain and Germany, signed in 1898 and confirmed in 1912, contemplated the partition of Angola and Mozambique between the former. [1] Thus the Portuguese government felt that the only way to stop its colonies from being traded like small change between Britain and Germany at the future peace talks was to be present at those talks with a voice of its own and the right to make demands from Britain after fighting alongside her. And the only way to achieve this was entering the war.

PORTUGAL'S ENTRY IN THE WAR

But Britain herself was not enthusiastic at all about an eventual participation of its Portuguese ally in the war. The British held the Portuguese armed forces in the utmost (even racist) contempt and considered the country as a whole an absolutely worthless ally, incapable of defending itself and its colonies, let alone giving some sort of positive contribution to the British war effort. [2]. Thus, despite skirmishes between German and Portuguese colonial troops and tribal revolts in Africa instigated by Germany were taking place since August 1914, in the same month the Portuguese government, under pressure from Britain, declared its neutrality, while reaffirming that the country was still bound by its old alliance with the United Kingdom. By 1915, though, the raising and training of a military force had already begun. [3]

Only the relentless butchery on the Western front convinced the British and French commands that the Portuguese forces could be of some use. Portugal was therefore "allowed" to enter the war. The actual cause of the formal German declaration of war on 9 March 1916 was the seizure of 36 German and Austro-Hungarian merchant ships anchored in front of Lisbon since the beginning of the war on 24 February 1916, at Britain's request. These were to be used by Portugal to carry vital foodstuffs for the civilian population (or so ran the official version).

Despite Portugal's assurance that the ships would be handed back to Germany and indemnities paid, the German minister (Ambassador) Van Rosen delivered a formal declaration of war by Germany on 9 March 1916, claiming Portugal was an "English vassal" and the seizure of the ships was an intentional provocation (the latter being of course absolutely correct). Portugal promptly reciprocated by declaring war on Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

THE CREATION OF THE PORTUGUESE EXPEDITIONARY CORPS


Portugese Troops Depart for the Western Front

After the German declaration of war on 9 March 1916, the Portuguese government pledged to send an expeditionary force to fight on the Western Front. Overcoming considerable difficulties, Portugal managed to raise a well equipped and trained force in just three months. This astounding achievement, of which a celebrated parade held at Montalvo in 22 July 1916 was the crowning glory, became known as "the miracle of Tancos" (Tancos being the camp where the forming of the Portuguese units and the training of its soldiers took place).

By a decree of 17 January 1917, two separate expeditionary forces were organized:

The Corpo de Artilharia Pesada Independente (CAPI) - Independent Heavy Artillery Corps - would consist of three mixed groups of three heavy batteries each (one of 320mm railway guns and two of 190mm or 240mm pieces), plus a depot battery, and would be placed under French operational command. All of these artillery pieces would be supplied by Great Britain.

The Corpo Expedicionário Português (CEP) - Portuguese Expeditionary Corps, originally supposed to consist of a single reinforced division, was expanded to a two division army corps, with a theoretical strength of 54976 men, in 12 February 1917. The CEP would be placed under the operational command of the British First Army in the Artois/Flanders front. [4]

In addition, Portugal fielded sizeable forces to defend its African colonies [5] against the German colonial forces under v. Lettow-Vorbeck in northern Mozambique and several tribal uprisings instigated by the Germans in southern Angola.

But it is primarily with the fate of the men of the CEP that this article is concerned.

THE CEP IN FRANCE




Men of the Corpo Expedicionário Português

The CEP began arriving at the harbour of Brest on 2 February 1917. From February 1917 until 28 October of the same year, a total of 59383 men were shipped to France. From Brest, the troops embarked on a three day long train travel until the concentration area of the CEP in the area of Aire-sur-la-Lys/Thérouanne, where they underwent training in trench and gas warfare prior to occupying their assigned position in the frontline. They also received British equipment, including helmets, and weaponry (namely the Short Magazine Lee Enfield and the Lewis gun). [6]

By 11 May 1917, the first Portuguese units took their place in the frontline, the deployment of the brigades being completed by 5 November of the same year. [7]

Problems started almost immediately. The soldiers hated the British rations and suffered badly during the extremely harsh winter of 1917-1918 (temperatures falling to -22º Centigrade - or -7.6 Fahrenheit), pacifist pamphlets saw widespread circulation in Portugal (not among the soldiers, who were in their overwhelming majority illiterate), the wits taking to calling the CEP "Carneiros de Exportação Portuguesa" - "Portuguese Exported Lambs for the Slaughter"), and morale was rock bottom, since the soldiers didn't feel they were fighting for their homeland far away on the cratered fields of Flanders. This in itself was not unusual in all Armies and home fronts, both increasingly war-weary by 1917. The real problem was that the CEP was denied any sort of replacements to reduce the effects of the attrition (the terrible "wastage" of trench warfare) caused by artillery bombardments, German trench raids (more than once in battalion strength), Portuguese counter-raids, sickness and desertion.

By 6 April 1918, the CEP had already lost 5420 men (1044 of which were killed).

Thus, by 9 April 1918, the Portuguese infantry brigades, whose establishment strength was 4660 officers and men each, were now down to 3679 (3 Brigade), 3270 (4 Brigade), 3053 (5 Brigade), and only 2999 (6 Brigade, only half of whose officers remained) troops. The CEP was lacking 5639 men on its infantry brigades alone. With these severely depleted brigades, the CEP had to man three successive lines of trenches and a further line of defence based around local villages to the rear, for a total of 40 km (over 24 miles). [8]

The exact reason why the CEP didn't receive the replacements sorely needed to hold all of these lines is somewhat contentious.

Some claim that it was the new (since 11 December 1917) Conservative and authoritarian government led by the charismatic (and Germanophile - he had been Portuguese ambassador in Berlin from 1912 to 1916) Sidónio Pais who decided not to send the badly needed replacements and supplies. Others say that it was the British themselves who refused to ship the replacements from May 1917 onwards because the transports were needed to bring American and Canadian troops to Europe.

Be that as it may, even if the dictatorship by Sidónio Pais did not "abandon" or "betray" its soldiers at the front, it was certainly against Portuguese participation in the war - which didn't help at all, and provided welcome ammunition to the German propaganda aimed at further demoralizing the soldiers. The practical result was that there simply weren't enough troops to provide the needed "roulement" at the frontline (some brigades remaining there for more than six consecutive months), which was too lengthy for the troops available to begin with. The periods of leave granted were ridiculously small, because it was feared that the troops would use it to go home for good. Many officers, however, displaying great soldierly virtue, did that anyway, leaving the troops leaderless. Of the 1920 officers to whom leave was granted, 822 didn't return to their units (in contrast, all of the soldiers on leave dutifully returned). [9]

THE SITUATION IN EARLY APRIL 1918


Training on the Lewis Gun

It was therefore not surprising that the commander of the CEP, General Fernando Tamagnini de Abreu e Silva, informed the politicians in Lisbon of the first mutinies in 4 April 1918. Finally alarmed, the British decided to relieve the CEP at the front, starting by the bulk of the 1st Division on 6 April [10] - whose sector, the southern half of the CEP's line, was taken over by the neighbouring British 55th (West Lancashire) Division, already in line [11] in front of La Bassée - and then the 2nd Division would go on the 9th of April, to be replaced by the British 55th and 50th (Northumbrian) Divisions. [12] General Gomes da Costa replaced General Simas Machado as commander of the 2nd Division. The division was placed under the operational control of the British XI Corps, commanded by General Richard Haking, an officer with a reputation for launching costly, pointless attacks, and of indifference to casualty figures. [13]

By 9 April 1918, the 4th, 5th and 6th Brigades of the 2nd Division held the frontline, with the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Division in reserve. [14]

But the Germans didn't wait. The 81st Reserve Division, which was until then facing the Portuguese sector, was already being replaced by several fresh attack divisions. [15]

For their "Georgette" offensive, the second of a series of offensives planned for the spring and summer of 1918, the German Sixth Army, facing the British First Army in Flanders, deployed a total of eight divisions against the Portuguese sector. [16] In the coming battle, the 20.000 men and 88 guns of the CEP, would face the brunt of the assault of the German LV and XIX Corps, with a total of almost 100.000 men supported by most of the 1700 artillery pieces assigned to the Sixth Army. [17]

The stage was being set for what is known in Portugal as "The Battle of La Lys" - 9 April 1918 - the first day of Ludendorff's Lys Offensive, otherwise known as "Operation Georgette", and as "Battle of Estaires" to the British official history.

THE GERMAN ASSAULT AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CEP

The German artillery bombardment opened at 4:15 AM of 9 April, hitting not only the frontline trenches but also the command and control centres and road network in the rear.

At 7:00 AM, the German infantry assault began, in greater force at the boundaries between the CEP and the neighbouring British divisions. Wearing gas masks and with rifles slung, the Germans attacked in three successive waves which kept a distance of 120 meters from each other, with gaps between each platoon (all platoons being preceded by four machine gun teams) to make manoeuvre easier, behind a creeping barrage that advanced 50 meters every four minutes. They found the wire to have been pulverized, and the trenches levelled, by their initial bombardment. The first defence lines were quickly overcome by the attackers, the Portuguese that survived the hellish shelling being mostly too dazed to offer any sort of effective resistance.

In the northern sector (see attached map for locations), defended by the Portuguese 4th (Minho) [18] Brigade (with the 8th and 20th Battalions in the frontline and the 3rd and 29th Battalions in reserve), the German 42nd Division, spearheaded by the 138th Infantry Regiment, nevertheless faced stubborn resistance by soldiers of the 8th Battalion, which fought a series of valiant delaying actions, joining the 29th battalion in a series of redoubts before the Brigade HQ at Laventie. At 11:00 AM, though, Laventie had been captured, and with it most of the soldiers of the 4th Brigade. The 8th Battalion's commander, Major Xavier da Costa, was eventually taken prisoner after being blinded and wounded three times.


CEP Troops Training for Assaulting Trenches

In the centre, the German 35th Division, with its 141st Infantry Regiment in the lead, quickly overwhelmed the Portuguese 1st and 2nd Battalions from Lisbon, which held the frontline. At the southern end of the battlefield, the 8th Bavarian Reserve Division, led by the 8th Bavarian Reserve Regiment, easily overran the Portuguese 17th battalion and the 11th battalion in reserve. The 1st Bavarian Reserve Division, attacking with its 1st Bavarian Reserve Regiment, met with some resistance from both the Portuguese 10th battalion and the 4th battalion held in the second line behind the former, but also made good progress until reaching Lacouture.

By 10:30-11:00 AM, the Portuguese artillery batteries to the rear were being overrun by the advancing Germans. The HQ of the 5th Brigade was captured at 13:00 PM by the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division, the brigade commander Colonel Manuel Martins and many other officers and men being killed and the remainder taken prisoner.

The seriousness of the situation led the British XI Corps commander Haking to release part of the mounted troops in the Corps reserve to try to help the Portuguese 3 Brigade in slowing down the German advance. Accordingly, the 1st battalion, King Edward's Horse and the 11th Cyclist Battalion were sent to the area of Lacouture, at the southwestern end of the CEP's sector, where some of their soldiers joined the Portuguese 13th Battalion and elements of the 15th in the defence of the village, under the command of Captain Bento Roma. Though encircled and under attack since 9:30 AM of 9 April, the defenders of Lacouture held on until 11:45 AM of 10 April, with 168 Portuguese and 77 British soldiers being taken prisoner. [19]

But elsewhere, the rout was complete. The remnants of the shattered Portuguese units retreated in disarray, leaving their dead and wounded and artillery behind, in such a way that the 2nd Division HQ, acting as a rallying point for the broken units, and now exposed, had to relocate twice during 9 April. The British committed elements of its 50th (Northumbrian) and 51st (Highland) Division to plug the large gap opened in the frontline. But for the CEP, the battle was over. [20]

AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS

The losses of the CEP on the 9 of April were 398 dead and 6585 taken prisoner (about 1500 of whom were estimated to be wounded). [21]

The collapse of the CEP can be explained by the insufficiency of the troops available to hold such a lengthy frontline and to provide unit rotation, to the crushing numerical superiority of the German attackers and the intensity of the preliminary bombardment, and to the exhausted and demoralized condition of the rank-and-file, which - and with good reason, as we have seen - considered itself left to its fate by the Portuguese Government, the British, and even its own officers, and finally to the fact that the CEP was attacked on the very day set for its relief. When all the facts all weighed in, it's obvious the battle could have only one outcome. When faced with a similar predicament in the opening day of the "Michael" offensive on 21 March, British troops at the southern wing of the Fifth Army had crumbled almost as badly.


Monument to Portugal's Unknown Soldier, Sintra

The survivors of the CEP were used by the British as labour for digging trenches and road repairs as "punishment" for what the British perceived as their "cowardice". Even though first some isolated Portuguese units and then the 1st Division did eventually return to the frontline for combat, it proved impossible to rebuild completely the CEP. Nonetheless, Portuguese troops earned, with this terrible sacrifice, their place at the famous Victory Parade in Paris on 14 July 1919. [22] The total losses of the CEP on the Western Front in 1917-1918 amounted to 2160 dead, 5224 wounded and 6678 prisoners. [23]

This was not the last time that Portuguese soldiers would die to keep the country's African colonies. The Portuguese people would be forced to do the same again in an anachronistic conflict against the African liberation movements which lasted from 1961 to 1974, with even more tragic results. NOTES (for full bibliographical details see the source index below):

1. Philippart (1)

2. Ramos, pgs. 498-500.

3. Castro Henriques/Rosas Leitão, pgs. 9-10.

4. The Portuguese command formally considered itself as "autonomous" but British maps and charts of the First Army sector always show the CEP as a part of that Army, in the same way as the other British or Canadian corps in the area.

5. 55000 troops, of which 32000 were metropolitan (Ramos, pg.13).

6. The main sources for the sections on the creation and shipping to France of the CAPI and CEP were Castro Henriques/Rosas Leitão, pgs. 10-14 and Philippart (1).

7. The 1st Brigade took its assigned place at the frontline by 30 May 1917, the 2nd Brigade by 16 June, the 3rd Brigade by 10 July, and the 4th Brigade by 23 September of the same year. Source: Ramalho de Mira.

8. Castro Henriques/Rosas Leitão - pg. 23 for the casualty figures, and pg. 61 for the CEP strength as of 9 April 1918.

9. Philippart (1)

10. According to a British First Army map used by the Department of Operations of the CEP's Corps HQ (Arquivo Historico-Militar - Military Historical Archives - 1st division, 35th section, box 110, no number) the HQ of the First Division of the CEP was already at the Aire sector in the rear area of First Army by 7 April.

11. The British 55th Division was already in the frontline (as shown by a map dated 31 March 1918 -Arquivo Histórico Militar, 1st division, 35th section, box 110, no number). The situation was possibly considered so serious that there wasn't even time to bring forward reserves to fill the gap left by the CEP's First Division.

12. The full text of the order, translated from Philippart (2), is as follows:

   a. The 50th Division is transferred from the XV to the XI Corps.
   b. The 55th Division will relieve the right flank brigade of the 2nd Portuguese Division in the night of 9 to 10 of April. The control of the sector of Ferme du Bois will be taken over by the 55th Division as soon as the latter finishes its deployment.
   c. The 50th Division will relieve the centre, left flank and reserve brigades of the 2nd Portuguese Division on the nights of 9 to 10 and of 10 to 11 of April. The control of the sectors of Neuve-Chapelle and Fauquissart will be taken over by the 50th Division at 10:00 AM of 10 April.
   d. The brigade boundaries will remain the same.
   e. The Portuguese artillery currently deployed will remain in place.
   f. As soon as the relief is finished, the brigades of the 2nd Portuguese Division will regroup on the XI Corps reserve area, according to the attached table. One battalion of each of the Portuguese brigades will remain under the orders of the 50th Division commander for work on the trenches.
   g. Report the receipt of this order.

13. See Haking's biography at http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/haking.htm

14. The Portuguese brigades included four infantry battalions each, the numbers of the latter being: 3rd Brigade - 9, 12, 14, 15 Battalions; 4th Brigade - 3, 8, 20, 29 Battalions; 5th Brigade - 4, 10, 13, 17 Battalions; 6th Brigade - 1, 2, 5, 11 Battalions.

15. Castro Henriques/Rosas Leitão, pg. 60, imply that the British commanders had at least some hints as to the German buildup and coming offensive - which is supported by the fact that, in a map registering the German divisions identified by British Intelligence, dated 10 April 1918 - at the Arquivo Histórico-Militar, 1st division, 35th section, box 110, no number - four of the attacking German divisions (the 35th, the 42nd, the 8th Bavarian Reserve and the 81st Reserve) had already been identified, presumably from information gathered over several days before the beginning of the offensive. However, the British didn't report any of their suspicions to the Portuguese.

16. These were: in the frontline, from north to south - the 42nd and 35th Divisions of the LV Corps (v. Bernhardi), and the 8th Bavarian Reserve and 1st Bavarian Reserve of the XIX Corps (v. Carlowitz). In support - the 10th Ersatz of the LV Corps. In the third echelon - the 117th Division and the 81st Reserve of the LV Corps and the 8th Division of the XIX Corps. Source: Castro Henriques/Rosas Leitão, pgs. 59, 63 and 65.

17. For these figures, Castro Henriques/Rosas Leitão, pg. 63.

18. Minho was the region of northern Portugal where the 4th Brigade had been recruited.

19. One must also not forget the bravery of Private Anibal Augusto Milhais of the 15th Battalion (better known as "Soldado Milhões" -Private Millions, because his commander, Ferreira do Amaral, called out to him saying he was worth millions of men), which, at Huit Maisons on 9 April, covered the retreat of many Allied troops with his Lewis gun while under heavy enemy attack, and thus became the most famous of Portugal's Great War heroes.

20. The main sources for the preceding paragraphs on the battle of La Lys on 9 April 1918 were Castro Henriques/Rosas Leitão, pgs. 63-77, and Philippart (2).

21. Castro Henriques/Rosas Leitão, pg. 79.

22. Castro Henriques/Rosas Leitão, pgs. 85-88.

23. Castro Henriques/Rosas Leitão, pg. 79.

SOURCES:

Primary

Arquivo Historico-Militar (Military Historical Archives), 1st division, 35th section, box 110. This box contains the operational - British-made - order of battle maps used by the Department of Operations at Corps HQ.

Secondary

a) Books

Kaiserschlacht 1918 - The Final German Offensive by Randal Gray. London, 1991.

La Lys 1918 - Os Soldados Desconhecidos by Mendo Castro Henriques and António Rosas Leitão. Lisbon, 2001.

The Viking Atlas of World War I by Anthony Livesey. London, 1994. Pgs.152-153.

O Grande Livro dos Portugueses by Manuel Alves de Oliveira. Lisbon, 1990. Pgs.358-359 and 392.

História de Portugal vol. 6 - A Segunda Fundação by Rui Ramos. Lisbon, 1994. Pgs. 13, 493-500, 516-519 and 526-527

História de Portugal vol. XI (1910-1926) by Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão. Lisbon, 1989. Pgs.178 and 204-206.

História Politica de Portugal 1910-1926 by Douglas L. Wheeler. Mem Martins, without date. Pgs.198-201.

b) Websites

Le Portugal dans la grande guerre 1914-1918 by J.M. Ramalho de Mira, at http://www.grande-guerre.org/Articles/portugal4.htm

L'entrée du Portugal dans la Grande Guerre (9 Mars 1916 - 11 Mai 1917) by Jean-Louis Philippart, at http://www.grande-guerre.org/Articles/Portugal.htm

L'armée portugaise au combat (11 Mai 1917 - 10 Avril 1918) by Jean-Louis Philippart, at http://www.grande-guerre.org/Articles/Portugal2.htm

Biography of General Richard Haking at http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/haking.htm

Many thanks to the helpful staff at the Arquivo Histórico-Militar and to Tony Langley of Antwerp, Belgium for the photos of the CEP. The images of the two monuments are my own. HR





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